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1.  Introduction 
A response-dependent account of a given attribute -- such as redness or 
wrongness -- identifies the attribute with the disposition to produce specified 
sorts of response in specified sorts of being under specified conditions.  
Schematically, response-dependent accounts often have roughly the 
following form: 
 
x is P =df For any being i of sort B, if x were presented under conditions C 
to i, i would respond in manner R.1 
 
For the moral case, this is often cast in roughly the following form: 
 
x is wrong =df For any being i of sort B, if under conditions C i were to 
consider x, i would disapprove of x. 
 
A fully developed sophisticated response-dependent account would fill in 
specifications for B (the beings) and C (the conditions), would probably 
replace the reference to disapproval with a reference to a more complex 
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response, and might involve a more complex scheme.2  For simplicity, 
however, I shall focus my argument on the above simple scheme of moral 
wrongness, since added complexities will be irrelevant to my argument. 
 Response-dependent accounts of moral (and other normative) 
attributes have received increased attention in recent years.3  These accounts 
are highly attractive in that they appear to incorporate the plausible elements 
of each of subjectivism and objectivism without their corresponding 
implausible elements.  Like subjectivism, response-dependent accounts 
ground normativity in the concerns and attitudes of mental beings -- and thus 
avoid postulating mysterious objectively prescriptive attributes.  Like 
objectivism, plausible response-dependent accounts deny that normativity is 
grounded in the concerns and attitudes that we happen to have -- it is only 
certain sorts of response of certain sorts of mental being under certain sorts 
of condition that are relevant.  Because we may not meet these conditions, 
our responses may well be in error -- both individually and collectively. 
 My purpose here is not to argue in favor of response-dependent 
accounts of moral attributes, but rather to argue that the ontological 
implications of such accounts have not been adequately understood.  For 
there are several very different sorts of response-dependent account, and for 
some -- perhaps the most plausible accounts -- the response-dependence is 
merely semantic and not ontological.  More specifically, response-dependent 
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accounts that rigidly fix (in a way that I shall make precise) the relevant 
responsive dispositions and conditions are, I shall argue, ontologically, 
simply a form of objectivism.  At some level, this point has been recognized 
by a number of authors, but in general it's significance, I shall suggest, has 
not been adequately appreciated. 
 
2. Some Background 
It should be noted that without some constraints on admissible beings, 
conditions, or responses, all attributes can be captured by a response-
dependent account.  Squareness (a paradigm primary quality), for example, 
is equivalent to being such that C-perfect squareness-detectors would 
perceive-as-square under conditions C (for some appropriate C) -- where C-
perfect squareness-detectors are hypothetical beings that under conditions C 
perceive-as-square all and only square things.  Squareness, that is, can be 
captured in terms of the responses of hypothetical sorts of responder.  And if 
squareness is capturable by a response-dependent account, anything is.  This 
shows that to be meaningful the response-dependence schema must be 
subject to some constraints on what sorts of being (or responses and 
conditions) may be specified.  One useful constraint is that the beings must 
be actually existing beings -- or even more narrowly, that they be actually 
existing human beings.  Squareness cannot be captured response-
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dependently with such a constraint.  Although I would defend the necessity 
of imposing some such constraint in order for the notion of response-
dependence to be significant, nothing in this paper hangs on how this issue is 
resolved. 
  A second point to note is as follows.  Response-dependent accounts 
appeal to how any being of sort B would respond.  Thus, there may be some 
complexity in the explicated attribute, given the possibility of different 
responses from different beings of sort B.  Response-dependent accounts do 
not necessarily assume that all Bs have exactly the same responsive 
dispositions.  In the moral case, for example, some Bs may approve under 
the specified circumstances of a certain form of affirmative action, and 
others may disapprove.  As a result, on a response-dependent account of 
wrongness and rightness, it may turn out that the given form of affirmative 
action may be neither permissible (since not all beings approve of it), nor 
impermissible (since not all disapprove of it).  On such an account 
permissibility and impermissibility would be mutually exclusive categories, 
but not exhaustive categories.  There would be a middle category of actions, 
etc. that are neither permissible nor impermissible.  This admittedly is 
incompatible with our common-sense notions, but the common-sense 
notions may well be mistaken in this regard.  Morality may not divide things 
quite so neatly into just the two categories of permissible and impermissible. 
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 Of course, if there is too much disagreement among the beings, and the 
middle category is too large, then the response-dependent accounts are 
implausible.  The point here is simply that a limited disagreement among the 
beings about some cases -- and so a limited middle category of assessment -- 
does not create major problems for response-dependent accounts.4 
 A final point to note is that, to be plausible, the responsive 
dispositions of mental beings specified by response-dependent accounts 
must be sensitive to certain attributes of the object (action) under scrutiny.  
Their reactions, that is, must be responses to the object -- and not just 
random reactions, or reactions merely to the surrounding environment.  The 
disapproval of an action, for example, must be based on some attribute of 
the action (e.g., its pain-inducing consequences).  For otherwise, the 
wrongness will not be based on attributes of the action. 
 The focus of this paper concerns the relation between the response-
dependent account of the wrongness of actions, and the underlying 
attribute(s) of actions which gives rise to the reactions of disapproval.5  Are 
the two attributes distinct or identical?  For example, if the beings in 
question disapprove of actions under the specified conditions when, and 
only when, the action fails to be happiness maximizing, is wrongness 
identical with failure to maximize happiness? 
 We must be cautious here.  For there are two radically different 
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forms that response-dependent accounts can take.  The issue turns on 
whether the relevant responsive dispositions are rigidly fixed or not.  After 
explaining the difference, I shall argue that non-rigid accounts make 
wrongness genuinely ontologically response-dependent, whereas rigid 
accounts do not.  On rigid response-dependent accounts moral attributes are 
entirely objective and their satisfaction conditions have no essential 
connection with the responsive dispositions that are used to pick them out. 
 
3. Non-Rigid Response-Dependent Accounts 
Some response-dependent accounts of wrongness, I shall argue, do not make 
wrongness ontologically response-dependent.  The key issue is whether, for 
a given claim of wrongness, the relevant responsive dispositions of the 
beings B and the conditions C are the same no matter what the time, world, 
and agent of the action being assessed are.  If the relevant responsive 
dispositions and conditions are fixed and the same for all actions evaluated, 
then the account is rigid, and if not, then the account is non-rigid. 
 A well known sort of non-rigid account is one for which the 
wrongness of an action is determined by how the members of the agent's 
society would at the time and in the world of the action respond to it.  Given 
that the specified responsive dispositions typically vary, at least somewhat, 
by society, time, and world, wrongness on this account genuinely tracks 
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responsive dispositions.  The dispositions vary, and wrongness varies along 
with them. 
 Because this sort of account is action-indexed (the relevant 
dispositions are those of the members of the action's agent), non-idealizing 
(the dispositions of the members are taken as they are, and not in some 
cleaned-up form, such as eliminating any malevolence), let us call this sort 
of account an action-indexed, non-idealizing account.  This sort of account, 
then, is non-rigid and genuinely ontologically response-dependent.  It has, 
however, a feature that is problematic.  Given that the dispositions are 
neither idealized (cleaned-up) nor rigidly fixed, it is possible that in some 
worlds or times (e.g., with different laws of nature, evolutionary mutations, 
or character-affecting atmospheric conditions) under conditions C beings of 
sort B approve of things which we find deeply morally repugnant.  For 
example, if in a given world and time the specified beings approve of torture 
for fun, then, according to the above sort of non-rigid response-dependent 
account, doing so in that world at that time would be morally permissible.  
But this strikes us as crazy.  Such beings, it seems, are morally depraved, 
and their responses are irrelevant.  Torture for fun, we want to say, is just 
plain wrong. 
 Action-indexed, non-idealized accounts seem to yield mistaken 
moral judgements about actions in worlds or times in which the specified 
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beings are "morally depraved", but things are not quite that simple.  For it 
depends on what sort of account of moral judgement is being considered.  
Internalist accounts reflect the perspective of the agent (his/her beliefs, 
values, etc.), whereas externalist accounts are based on the facts of the 
situation (and not necessarily the agent's perspective thereof).6  There has 
been a long debate about whether moral judgements are internalist or 
externalist.  In my view, much of this debate has been misguided in 
assuming that all moral judgements are internalist or all moral judgements 
are externalist.  For, it seems to me, we can, do, and should, make moral 
judgements of both sorts.  Sometimes we want to assess an agent's actions 
from his/her own perspective, and sometimes we want to assess them from a 
more objective perspective. 
 Although the above sort of non-rigid account is implausible as an 
account of externalist moral judgement (since it judges torture for fun 
morally permissible in depraved worlds), it is not clearly implausible as an 
account of internalist moral judgement (since internalist accounts by their 
very nature reflect the perspective of the agent).  Furthermore, even as an 
externalist account, an action-indexed account can be made more plausible 
by partially idealizing the relevant responsive dispositions and conditions.  
That is, the problem of depraved reactions can be reduced by appealing to 
how the member's of the agent's society would respond if the conditions and 
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their responsive dispositions were suitably ideal (e.g., if they were fully 
informed, fully rational, and benevolent).  And as long as the idealization is 
not full - that is, as long as the determination of the relevant dispositions and 
conditions depends at least in part on the actual dispositions or conditions - 
the account will still be non-rigid (since the relevant dispositions and 
conditions will vary at least somewhat) and thus  genuinely response-
dependent. 
 In sum, whatever their plausibility, non-idealized, and partially 
idealized, action-indexed accounts of moral wrongness are non-rigid 
accounts, and thus make moral wrongness genuinely ontologically response-
dependent.  As we shall now see, this is not the case for rigid response-
dependent accounts. 
 
4.  Rigid Response-Dependent Accounts 
A rigid response-dependent account of wrongness, recall, is one for which 
there is a fixed (non-variable) set of responsive dispositions and conditions 
(including the laws and regularities governing those responsive dispositions) 
that is the basis for evaluating the wrongness of all actions.7  Historically, 
the most well-known sort of rigid account is the ideal observer theory.  
According to (a simple form of) of this account, to say that an action is 
wrong is to say that it would be disapproved of when considered under 
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specified ideal conditions by specified ideal (e.g., fully rational and perfectly 
benevolent) beings.8  Such an account is rigid, because neither the relevant 
conditions nor the relevant responsive dispositions vary with the action 
being assessed.  All actions -- no matter who the agent, or what the time or 
world of performance -- are assessed on the basis of the rigidly specified 
ideal conditions and ideal responders.9 
 Another common sort of rigid account is the speaker-indexed, non-
idealized account, according to which the truth of a claim of wrongness of a 
particular action, made by a particular person at a given time in a given 
world, is determined by how the members of the speaker's society would 
respond to that action at the time and in the world at which the claim is 
made.  Such an account is rigid, because there is a fixed set of responsive 
dispositions that determine whether actions are wrong -- no matter what the 
agent, time, or world of the action is.10 
 I shall argue that, because there is no variability in the relevant 
dispositions and conditions, wrongness on rigid accounts does not track 
responsive dispositions in any interesting ontological sense. 
 On a rigid response-dependent account it is only the responsive 
dispositions of a fixed set of beings in some fixed specified world and time 
that determines whether a given action is wrong.  The wrongness of actions 
is thus not (normally) determined by the responsive dispositions in the world 
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and time of the action, but rather by the responsive dispositions in some 
independently and rigidly specified world and time.  As a result, the account 
can avoid, by the appropriate choice of beings, time and world, the above 
problem of "depraved reactions".  For the mere fact the beings might in 
some worlds or at some times, approve of infliction of pain for fun is 
irrelevant on a rigid response-dependent account to the wrongness of the 
action.  All that is relevant is whether in the rigidly specified world and time 
the beings would disapprove.  Assuming that the specified beings in the 
specified world and time would disapprove of the infliction of pain for fun, 
we may conclude that, in worlds or times at which such beings would 
approve of such behavior, they are morally depraved. 
 Rigid response-dependent accounts avoid the problem of depraved 
reactions by making wrongness much more objective than non-rigid 
accounts.  Indeed, they make wrongness so objective that in an important 
sense it ceases to be response-dependent.  For wrongness so understood does 
not track the responsive dispositions of beings of type B.  Rather it tracks 
only the responsive dispositions of beings of type B as they are manifested in 
the rigidly specified world and time under the rigidly specified conditions 
(which include the laws governing the dispositions).11  And under those 
conditions the responsive dispositions just track some specific underlying 
attributes (e.g., failure to maximize happiness).  Given the rigid 
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specification, this is not a contingent matter: wrongness, so understood, just 
is whatever evokes, under the rigidly specified conditions, the specified 
response from the rigidly fixed responsive dispositions of the beings at the 
rigidly specified time and world.  Consequently, wrongness is identical with 
the evoking attributes. 
 An analogy may make this point clearer for the case of rigid speaker-
indexed rigid response-dependent accounts.   Consider the understanding of 
`water' along the following quasi-Kripkean lines: 
 
Water =df dthe stuff that has the chemical structure that the clear stuff that 
we drink and flows in rivers has [where "dthe" indicates a rigidification 
relative to the context of use].12 
 
So understood, water (as we use the term) is stuff with a particular chemical 
structure (H2O), and has no necessary connection with what we drink and 
with what flows in rivers.  In some worlds, or possible future times, what we 
drink and what flows in rivers is not water so understood.  Facts about what, 
here and now, we drink and flows in rivers are simply used to pick out -- 
rigidly -- a specific chemical structure.  In a similar manner in the moral 
case, speaker-indexed rigid dispositional accounts appeal to certain 
approbational dispositions to rigidly pick out a specific underlying attribute, 
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but the attribute picked out has no necessary connection with those 
approbational dispositions.  In some worlds and times the specified beings 
may have different approbations dispositions, or be under different 
conditions, and so may not respond to the presence of the underlying 
attribute in the specified manner (e.g., with disapproval). 
 In short, rigid response-dependent accounts do not track the 
responsive dispositions of individuals.  They track -- because they are 
identical with -- the underlying attribute that gives rise to the relevant 
responses in the rigidly specified world and time.   
 The above argument rests on three assumptions that should be made 
explicit.  One assumption is that the specified responsive dispositions are 
dispositions to respond to certain underlying attributes of the actions.  More 
strongly, it is assumed that for a specified responsive disposition, there are 
attributes of actions that are nomologically sufficient under the specified 
conditions to evoke the specified responses (approval, disapproval, etc.).  
Without this assumption response-dependent accounts would be implausible 
-- for the wrongness an action would not be determined by its attributes. 
 A second assumption is that the disjunction of the attributes of 
actions that are nomologically sufficient for the specified response is also an 
attribute of actions.  This assumption ensures that there is a unique attribute 
(namely the disjunction of all sufficient attributes) that is nomologically 
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necessary and sufficient for evoking the specified response.  Whether the 
disjunction of several attributes is itself an attribute (i.e., whether attributes 
are closed under disjunction) depends on exactly how attributehood is 
understood.  Here I am understanding an attribute to be anything (1) that is 
capable of instantiation (realization, exemplification), and (2) for which 
identity is conceptually necessary coinstantiation.  So understood, it is 
trivially true that the set of attributes is closed under disjunction. 
 Of course, if one understood attributehood in the logically sparser 
sense of universal (natural attribute) -- where not all things capable of 
instantiation are universals -- it is not obvious that attributehood is closed 
under disjunction.  For example, one might hold that having a mass of 
exactly 2 kilograms and having a velocity of exactly 20 kilometers per hour 
are each natural attributes, but deny that their disjunction is -- on the grounds 
that the disjunction does not "carve nature at the joints".13  Given this 
possibility, it may well be that there is no universal, or natural attribute, that 
is nomologically necessary and sufficient for the specified responses.  But I 
am not claiming anything about universals, or natural attributes, in this 
logically sparse sense.  I am only making the fairly trivial claim that 
attributes in the above logically abundant sense are closed under disjunction. 
 A third assumption of the above argument is that the identity of 
attributes is determined by necessary co-instantiation.  This assumption 
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permits the inference from the necessary coinstantiation of wrongness and 
the response-evoking attribute to the identity of the two.  Of course, the 
plausibility of this assumption depends again on how attributehood is 
understood.  As indicated above, this assumption is part of my stipulated 
understanding of attributehood.  And it clearly holds for that understanding. 
 Now, there are understandings of attributehood for which the 
assumption fails.  In particular, if one understands attributes to be structured 
(have parts that fit together in specific ways), then necessary coinstantiation 
will not be sufficient (although it is necessary) for identity.  The attribute of 
being green and heavy, on this understanding, would be distinct from that of 
being heavy and green.  For although the two are necessarily coextensive, 
the former has greenness as its first part, whereas the latter has heaviness as 
its first part.  Although the idea of structured attributes may seem a bit 
mysterious, perfect sense can be made of it by thinking of structured 
attributes as logical trees (certain sorts of ordered set) of non-structured 
attributes.14  Appeal to structured attributes is clearly useful for the purposes 
of ascribing contents to mental attitudes (such as belief and desire) of finite 
beings to whom logical consequences (of a given attribute or proposition) 
are not transparent.  The point here is that, because we are interested in 
attributes of actions independently of how they are conceptualized by mental 
beings, I am understanding attributes in the unstructured sense.15 
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 Given the above understanding of attributehood, the existence of an 
attribute that is nomologically necessary and sufficient for evoking the 
specified response, and its identity with the rigid response-dependent notion 
of wrongness, is guaranteed.  Although there are understandings of 
attributehood for which such existence or identity may not hold, the above 
understanding of attributehood is a fairly standard understanding, and one 
that is relevant to the issue of response-dependence.  Consequently, in at 
least one important sense the explicated attribute (e.g., wrongness) and the 
underlying attribute base are indeed identical. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Historically, response-dependent accounts of moral notions were developed 
as attempts to ground moral normativity in the concerns and attitudes of 
mental beings—and thereby to avoid postulating mysterious objectively 
prescriptive attributes.  The original accounts were non-rigid, and thus 
genuinely response-dependent and non-objective.  In response to the 
problem of depraved reactions (e.g., where due to atmospheric changes we 
approve of torture), however, rigid dispositional account have been 
developed.  Wrongness on these accounts is identical with whatever 
attributes evoke the specified response in the rigidly specified world. 
 The core point has been that rigid response-dependent accounts are 
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not genuinely ontologically response-dependent.  They are rather forms of 
objectivism.  They do not track in any interesting sense the responses of the 
specified beings.  Rigid response-dependent accounts merely appeal to 
responsive dispositions and conditions to rigidly identify certain non-
response-dependent attributes as normative attributes.16 
 Although this point is implicitly recognized by many, there is still a 
tendency to view rigid response-dependent accounts as non-objectivist 
theories.  For example, rigid response-dependent accounts of moral 
properties are thought to be non-objectivist in contrast with "Cornell 
realists" accounts.17  If the above argument is correct, however, rigid 
response-dependent accounts may be simply picking out dispositionally the 
sort of objective moral attribute the realists believe in. 
 This does not mean that rigid response-dependent accounts have no 
advantages over other forms of objectivism.  On the contrary, as semantic 
accounts they may offer clear accounts of what functional/responsive 
attributes we care about in moral discourse, and how we could discover what 
(objective) base attributes give rise to those responses.  At the level of 
concepts (individuated by what any competent language user would know a 
priori) rigid response-dependent accounts may be enlightening explications. 
 But the corresponding attributes (individuated by their instantiation 
conditions) are perfectly objective.  In short, although rigid semantic 
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response-dependence accounts do not yield ontological response-
dependence, they may do important work by supplying an account of why 
one particular non-response-dependent attribute is moral wrongness.18 
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 Notes 
 
1.For simplicity, I shall ignore Mark Johnston's important point that having a disposition to generate response R in Bs under 
conditions C is not equivalent to being such that if it were presented to a B under conditions C, then the B would respond with R.  
The difference will not be relevant for my argument.  For more on this point, see p.232 of Johnston 1992. 
2.To give but one example of a different scheme:  x is wrong =df x violates the norms that under conditions C would generate 
response R by beings of sort B. 
3.For general discussions of the response-dependent approach to moral semantics see the essays cited below, and, for example: 
McDowell 1985, Blackburn 1985, Goldman 1987, Wright 1988, Pettit 1991, Brower 1993, and the essays in the long awaited (!) 
Haldane & Wright 1993.  Also useful are the more general discussions of response-dependence in Wright 1992, Johnston 1992, 
and Jackson & Pargetter 1987. 
4.For an interesting discussion of indeterminacies for the objectivist/non-objectivist debate, see Shafer-Landau 1994. 
5.Of course there may be several attributes of actions that give rise to disapproval: failure to maximize happiness, breaking of 
agreements, deception, infliction of pain, etc.  Each may be sufficient for the disapproval response.  In this case, references to "the" 
underlying attribute should be understood as references to the most general attribute that elicits the response (i.e., the disjunction 
of all the more specific features).  This move is discussed below. 
6.This issue is distinct, although closely related, the issue of whether an agent's moral judgement necessarily provides motivation 
(which also goes under the internalist/externalist title). 
7.The following authors each invoke and defend rigid accounts: Smith 1987, Smith 1989, Johnston 1989, and Lewis 1989.  To my 
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mind, they successfully answer the concerns voiced in the excellent Campbell & Pargetter 1986. 
8.Here I'm waiving my concern that without restricting admissible responders to actual ones, every attribute will turn out to be 
response-dependent. 
9.Idealized accounts -- partial or full -- may well be able to overcome the problem of depraved reactions.  They face, however, a 
problem of their own.  For idealization distances the specified responsive dispositions from those of the assessor.  Assessors 
typically have responsive dispositions that are quite unlike the idealized dispositions: typical assessors are not, for example, 
perfectly rational or fully benevolent.  As a result, it is not clear that the responses of idealized responders are relevant for our 
practical concerns of assessing behavior.  This point is made very effectively in Sayre-McCord 1994. 
10.Speaker-indexed, rigid accounts have a feature that some may find problematic.  For on such accounts, moral attributes are 
indexical the way that terms such as "I", "here", and "now" are.  They have, that is, a specific content only relative to a context of 
use.  Just as there is no monadic attribute of I-ness or now-ness (but only a dyadic attribute between persons and contexts), there, 
on this account, is no monadic attribute of wrongness.  Just as the proposition expressed by "I am here." is different when asserted 
by you than when asserted by me, so too the proposition expressed by "Abortion is wrong" may be different on a speaker-indexed 
account when asserted in different worlds or different times (since different approbational dispositions may be referenced).  One 
way of avoiding this problem, which I shall not explore here, is to privilege a particular context of use -- e.g., the initial baptismal 
use à la Kripke -- and then invoke a historical account of reference that hooks later uses with the responsive dispositions of the 
beings referenced in the initial use. 
11.On idealized accounts (unlike speaker-indexed accounts) the relevant responders may come from many different worlds, since 
there may be many worlds with ideal conditions and ideal responders.  For simplicity, in the text I will write as if there is a unique 
  
  
 
 24 
  
ideal world picked out. 
12.This differs from Kripke's proposal in that it holds that the reference of "water" is rigidly fixed anew on each occasion of use
(as the reference of "I" and "now" are) -- as opposed to there being a causal connection with one original baptismal reference-
fixing.  Below I will mention a response-dependent account that more closely parallels Kripke's account for "water".  See Kripke 
1971.  For more on indexicals, rigidification, and contexts of use, see Kaplan 1970. 
13.Something like this understanding of featurehood is implicit in particularist objections to universal moral principles, and to 
universal accounts of the attributes that give rise to dispositional responses.  They may grant that there are ad hoc disjunctions of 
attributes that are appropriately equivalent, but they deny that these disjunctions have any "natural shape".  See for example, 
Dancy 1993 (especially Ch. 9). 
14.See, for example, Bealer 1982, and Lewis 1986, pp. 55-59. 
15.It may seem inappropriate to abstract away from how attributes are conceptualized by mental beings, since we are concerned 
with their responses and those responses depend in part on how they conceptualize attributes.  In reply, it is certainly correct that 
the response of any given being will depend on his/her cognitive set (e.g., background beliefs, inferential dispositions, etc.).  If the 
specification of the beings and conditions are compatible with different beings having different cognitive sets, then there will be 
some indeterminacy in the notion of response-dependent account of wrongness.  For actions with the very same unstructured 
attributes may evoke different responses from different beings.  This does not, however, require the response-dependent account to 
invoke the structured notion of attributes.  It merely requires the acknowledgement that there may be some indeterminacy in the 
notion of wrongness. 
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16.Although I have focussed only on response-dependent accounts for moral wrongness, the argument and conclusion are, I think, 
easily generalizable to functional accounts (of which response-dependent accounts are but one type) of anything.  For the same 
reasoning supports the conclusion that non-rigid functional accounts genuinely track the specified functional role, whereas rigid 
functional accounts track the underlying basis that fills the functional role in the context of rigidification. 
17.See, for example, Sturgeon 1984, Railton 1986, Boyd 1988, and Brink 1989.  See also Lewis 1989, where he describes his rigid 
account as subjectivist. 
18.I thank Chuck Cross, Jonathan Dancy, Chris Gauker, John Heil, Brad Hooker, Eugene Mills, Geoff Sayre-McCord, and the 
audience Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University for helpful comments. 
